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Abstract
Inspired by biophysical principles underlying
nonlinear dendritic computation in neural cir-
cuits, we develop a scheme to train deep neu-
ral networks to make them robust to adversar-
ial attacks. Our scheme generates highly nonlin-
ear, saturated neural networks that achieve state
of the art performance on gradient based adver-
sarial examples on MNIST, despite never being
exposed to adversarially chosen examples dur-
ing training. Moreover, these networks exhibit
unprecedented robustness to targeted, iterative
schemes for generating adversarial examples, in-
cluding second-order methods. We further iden-
tify principles governing how these networks
achieve their robustness, drawing on methods
from information geometry. We find these net-
works progressively create highly flat and com-
pressed internal representations that are sensitive
to very few input dimensions, while still solving
the task. Moreover, they employ highly kurtotic
weight distributions, also found in the brain, and
we demonstrate how such kurtosis can protect
even linear classifiers from adversarial attack.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have demonstrated success
in many machine learning tasks, including image recogni-
tion (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), speech recognition (Hinton
et al., 2012), and even modelling mathematical learning
(Piech et al., 2015), among many other domains. How-
ever, recent work has exposed a remarkable weakness in
deep neural networks (Szegedy et al., 2014) (see (Warde-
Farley & Goodfellow, 2016) for a survey), namely that very
small perturbations to the input of a neural network can
drastically change its output. In fact, in image classifi-
cation tasks, it is possible to perturb the pixels in such a
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way that the perturbed image is indistinguishable from its
original counterpart to a human observer, but the network’s
class prediction is completely altered. These adversarial
examples suggest that despite the above successes, machine
learning models are not fundamentally understanding the
tasks that they are trained to perform.
Furthermore, the imperceptibility of these adversarial per-
turbations to human observers suggests that these machine
learning algorithms are performing computations that are
vastly different from those performed by the human vi-
sual system. This discrepancy is of particular scientific
concern as deep neural networks now form foundational
models in neuroscience for the visual processing stream
(Yamins et al., 2014; McIntosh et al., 2016; Kriegeskorte,
2015). So their susceptibility to adversarial perturbations
that are imperceptible to us suggest our models are missing
a fundamental ingredient that is implemented in the brain.
However, the existence of adversarial examples is also of
particular technological concern in machine learning, as
these adversarial examples generalize across architectures
and training data, and can therefore be used to attack ma-
chine learning systems deployed in society, without requir-
ing knowledge of their internal structure (Papernot et al.,
2016a; Warde-Farley & Goodfellow, 2016).
It is important to note that adversarial examples of this
form are not limited to deep networks but are also an issue
even in linear high dimensional classification and regres-
sion problems. A plausible explanation (Goodfellow et al.,
2015) for the existence of these adversarial examples lies
in the idea that any algorithm that linearly sums its high
dimensional input vectors with many small weights can be
susceptible to an attacker that adversarially perturbs each
of the individual inputs by a small amount so as to move
the entire sum in a direction that would make an incorrect
classification likely. This idea lead to a fast method to find
adversarial examples which could then be used to explicitly
train neural networks to be robust to their own adversarial
examples (Goodfellow et al., 2015).
However, it is unclear that biological circuits explicitly find
their own adversarial examples by optimizing over inputs
and training against them. Therefore, we are interested in
guarding against adversarial examples in a more biologi-
cally plausible manner, without explicitly training on ad-
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versarial examples themselves. Of particular interest is iso-
lating and exploiting fundamental regimes of operation in
the brain that prevent the imperceptible perturbations that
fool deep networks, from fooling us. In this paper, we
take inspiration from one fundamental aspect of single neu-
ron biophysics that is not often included in artificial deep
neural networks, namely the existence of nonlinear com-
putations in intricate, branched dendritic structures (Stu-
art et al., 2016; Koch, 1999; London & Ha¨usser, 2005).
These nonlinear computations prevent biological neurons
from performing weighted sums over many inputs, the key
factor thought to lead to susceptibility to adversarial exam-
ples. Indeed, the biophysical mechanism for linear sum-
mation in neurons corresponds to the linear superposition
of trans-membrane voltage signals as they passively propa-
gate along dendrites. These voltage waves can linearly sum
synaptic inputs. However, there is also a high density of
active ionic conductances spread through the dendritic tree
that can destroy this linear superposition property in purely
passive dendrites, thereby limiting the number of synapses
that can linearly sum toO(10)−O(100). These active con-
ductances lead to high threshold, nonlinear switch like be-
havior for voltage signalling. As a result, many parts of the
dendritic tree exist in voltage states that are either far be-
low threshold, or far above, and therefore saturated. Thus
biological circuits, due to the prevalence of active dendritic
processing, may operate in a highly nonlinear switch-like
regime in which it is very difficult for small input perturba-
tions to propagate through the system to create large errors
in output.
Rather than directly mimic this dendritic biophysics in ar-
tificial neural networks, here we take a more practical ap-
proach and take inspiration from this biophysics to train
artificial networks into a highly nonlinear operating regime
with many saturated neurons. We develop a simple training
scheme to find this nonlinear regime, and we find, remark-
ably, that these networks achieve state of the art robustness
to adversarial examples despite never having access to ad-
versarial examples during training. Indeed we find 2-7%
error rates on gradient-based adversarial examples gener-
ated on MNIST, with little to no degradation in the original
test set performance.
Furthermore, we go beyond performance to scientifically
understand which aspects of learned circuit computation
confer such adversarial robustness. We find that our
saturated networks, compared to unsaturated networks,
have highly kurtotic weight distributions, a property that
is shared by synaptic strengths in the brain (Buzsa´ki &
Mizuseki, 2014). Also, our networks progressively cre-
ate across layers highly clustered internal representations
of different image classes, with widely separated clusters
for different classes. Furthermore we analyze the infor-
mation geometry of our networks, finding that our satu-
rated networks create highly flat input-output functions in
which one can move large distances in pixel space without
moving far in output probability space. Moreover, our sat-
urated networks create highly compressed mappings that
are typically sensitive to only one direction in input space.
Both these properties make it difficult even for powerful
adversaries capable of iterative computations to fool our
networks, as we demonstrate. Finally, we show that the
highly kurtotic weight distributions that are found both in
our model and in biological circuits, can by themselves
confer robustness to adversarial examples in purely linear
classifiers.
2. Adversarial Example Generation
We consider a feedforward network F with D layers of
weights W1, . . . ,WD and D + 1 layers of neural activity
vectors x0, . . . ,xD, with Nl neurons in each layer l, so
that xl ∈ RNl and Wl is an Nl×Nl−1 weight matrix. The
feedforward dynamics elicited by an input x0 are
xl = φ(hl) hl = Wl xl−1 + bl for l = 1, . . . , D − 1
xD = softmax(hD),
where bl is a vector of biases, hl is the pattern of inputs
to neurons at layer l, and φ is a single neuron scalar non-
linearity that acts component-wise to transform inputs hl
to activities xl. We take y to be the class indicator vector
generated from xD. We also denote by xD = F (x0) the
network’s composite transformation from input to output.
For such networks, the essential idea underlying adversar-
ial examples is to start with a test example x0 that is cor-
rectly classified by the network with class indicator vec-
tor y, and transform it through an additive perturbation
∆x0 into a new input x0 + ∆x0 that is incorrectly clas-
sified by the network F as having a “goal” class label
yG 6= y. Moreover, the perturbation ∆x0 should be of
bounded norm so as to be largely imperceptible to a hu-
man observer. This idea leads naturally to an optimization
problem:
arg min
∆x0
‖∆x0‖ s.t. F (x0 + ∆x0) = yG. (1)
However, as this is a complex optimization, many sim-
pler methods have been proposed to efficiently generate
adversarial examples (e.g. (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Miy-
ato et al., 2016; Papernot et al., 2016a)). In particular, the
fast gradient sign method of Goodfellow et al. (2015) is
perhaps the most efficient method. Motivated by the no-
tion that adversarial attacks can arise even in linear prob-
lems in high dimensional spaces, Goodfellow et al. (2015)
linearized the input-output map F around the test exam-
ple and searched for bounded l∞ norm perturbations that
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maximize the network’s cost function over the linearized
network. More precisely, suppose the cost function of the
network is C0 = C(F (x0),y), then its linearization is
C(F (x0 + ∆x0),y) ≈ C0 + (∇FC)J(∆x0), (2)
where J is the Jacobian of F . Then the bounded l∞ norm
optimization that maximizes cost has the exact solution
sgn(∇FCJ) = arg max
∆x0
(∇FC)J(∆x0) s.t. ‖∆x0‖∞ ≤ .
(3)
If a network can be susceptible to these gradient-based ad-
versaries, then we can choose  to be small enough for the
given dataset so it is imperceptible to human observers yet
large enough for the network to misclassify. For MNIST,
Goodfellow et al. (2015) took  = 0.25, since each pixel is
in [0, 1]. We follow this prescription in our experiments.
With efficient methods of generating adversarial examples
(3), Goodfellow et al. (2015) harnessed them to develop
adversarial training, whereby the network is trained with
the interpolated cost function:
αC + (1− α)C(F (x0 +  sgn(∇FC)J),y), (4)
As a result, the network is trained at every iteration on ad-
versarial examples generated from the current version of
the model. On maxout networks trained on MNIST, Good-
fellow et al. (2015) found that they achieved an error rate of
89.4% on adversarial examples, and with adversarial train-
ing (where α = 0.5), they were able to lower this to an
error rate of 17.9%.
We now turn to ways to avoid training on adversarial ex-
amples, in order to have the networks be more intrinsi-
cally robust to their adversarial examples. Papernot et al.
(2016b) suggested knowledge distillation, which involves
changing a temperature parameter T on the final softmax
output in order to ensure that the logits are more spread
apart. However, the authors do not try their approach on
adversarial examples generated by the fast gradient sign
method, nor does this approach address the broader criti-
cism of Goodfellow et al. (2015) that models susceptible
to gradient-based adversaries operate heavily in the linear
regime. We develop a method that strongly departs from
the high dimensional linear regime in which adversarial
examples abound. The basic idea is to force networks to
operate in a nonlinear saturating regime.
3. Saturating Networks
A natural starting point to achieve adversarial robustness is
to ensure that each element of the Jacobian of the model,
J = ∂F/∂x0, is sufficiently small, so that the model is not
sensitive to perturbations in its inputs. Jacobian regular-
ization is therefore the most direct method of attaining this
goal; however, for sufficiently large networks, it is compu-
tationally expensive to regularize the Jacobian as its dimen-
sions can become cumbersome to store in memory.
An immediate alternative would be to use a contractive
penalty as in Gu & Rigazio (2015), whereby the Frobenius
norm of the layer-wise Jacobian is penalized:
D∑
l=1
λl
∥∥∥∥ ∂hl∂hl−1
∥∥∥∥
F
, (5)
where each λl ∈ R. For element-wise nonlinearities, Ri-
fai et al. (2011) show that this penalty can be computed
in O
(
maxl
(∣∣xl∣∣× ∣∣xl−1∣∣)) time, where |·| denotes the
length (number of units).
While indirectly encouraging the activations to be pushed
in the saturating regime of the nonlinearity, this contractive
penalty can nonetheless be practically difficult to compute
efficiently for networks with a large number of hidden units
per layer, and also tends to limit the model’s capacity to
learn from data, degrading test set accuracy.
Saturating autoencoders were introduced by Goroshin &
LeCun (2013) as a means of explicitly encouraging activa-
tions to be in the saturating regime of the nonlinearity, in
order to limit the autoencoder’s ability to reconstruct points
that are not close by on the data manifold. Their penalty
takes the following form for a given activationh = Wx+b
and λ ∈ R,
λ
|h|∑
i=1
φc(hi), (6)
where the complementary function is defined as:
φc(z) ≡ inf
z′∈S
|z − z′|, S = {z | φ′(z) = 0}, (7)
and reflects the distance of any individual activation to the
nearest saturation region. Not only is this penalty simple,
but it can be cheaply computed in O(|h|) time.
4. Experiments and Results
Here we adapt the above regularization, originally designed
for autoencoders, to protect against adversarial examples
in supervised classification networks. We found that ap-
plying this regularization to every network layer, including
the readout layer prior to the softmax output, worked best
against adversarial examples generated by the fast gradient
sign method. Thus, our penalty took the following form:
λ
D∑
l=1
Nl∑
i=1
φc(h
l
i). (8)
Observe that for a ReLU function, the complementary
function in (7) is itself, so φc(z) = max{0, z}. While
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Table 1. Classification accuracies for the various networks. Each column consists of the test set accuracy (left) and the accuracies on the
adversarial examples generated from the test set (right). For each model class, the best performance on the adversarial set is in bold.
TRAINING SIGMOID MLP RELU MLP CNN
VANILLA 97.6% 0% 98.1% 0.41% 99.35% 5.62%
ADVERSARIAL 92.27% 81.71% 92.29% 91.04% 99.32% 83.83%
SATURATED 97.01% 94.43% 95.24% 94.59% 99.33% 98.45%
Table 2. CNN architecture details.
LAYER TYPE ARCHITECTURE
RELU CONVOLUTIONAL 32 FILTERS (5× 5)
MAX POOLING 2× 2
RELU CONVOLUTIONAL 64 FILTERS (5× 5)
MAX POOLING 2× 2
RELU FULLY CONNECTED 1024 UNITS
SOFTMAX 10 UNITS
the definition in (7) can also be intricately extended to
differentiable functions (as is done in (Goroshin & Le-
Cun, 2013)), for a sigmoid function we can simply take
φc(z) = |σ′(z)| = |σ(z)(1− σ(z))|, since the sigmoid is a
monotonic function.
We used TensorFlow for all of our models (Abadi et al.,
2015), and we trained both 3 layer multilayer perceptrons
(MLPs) with sigmoid and ReLU nonlinearities, as well as
convolutional neural networks (CNNs) on 10-class MNIST.
For comparison, we trained the adversarially trained net-
works as in (4), finding that α = 0.5 gave the best perfor-
mance. Each network was optimized for performance sep-
arately, and we varied the number of hidden units for the
MLPs to be between 200-2000 to choose the architecture
that provided the best performance. Our CNN architec-
ture is detailed in Table 2, and we used the stronger penalty
f(z) = z only at the last layer of the CNN. We used Adam
(Kingma & Ba, 2015) as our optimizer.
In order to effectively train with the saturating penalty in
(8), we found that annealing λ during training was essen-
tial. Starting with λmin = 0, this was progressively in-
creased to λmax = 1.74 in steps of size 0.001 for the sig-
moidal MLP, λmax = 3.99 × 10−8 in steps of size 10−10
for the ReLU MLP, and λmax = 10−5 in steps of size 10−5
for the CNN. We ultimately found that the CNN was easier
to find an annealing schedule for than the MLPs, further
suggesting the viability of this approach in practice.
We list above our results in Table 1. As can be seen,
for each model class, we are able to maintain (with little
degradation) the original test set accuracy of the network’s
vanilla counterpart, while also outperforming the adversar-
ially trained counterpart on the adversarial set generated
from the test set. We now turn to analyzing the source of
adversarial robustness in our networks.
5. Internal Representation Analysis
We now examine the internal representations learned by
saturating networks (in particular the MLPs) and compare
them to those learned by their vanilla counterparts, to gain
insight into distinguishing features that make saturating
networks intrinsically robust to adversarial examples.
 0.4 0.0 0.40
1500
3000
Va
ni
lla
Layer 1
 2 = 1.06
 0.4 0.0 0.40
700
1400
Layer 2
 2 = 0.6
 0.4 0.0 0.40
100
200
Layer 3
 2 = 0.41
 3 0 30
10000
20000
S
at
ur
at
ed
Layer 1
 2 = 117
 3 0 30
15000
30000
Layer 2
 2 = 681
 4 0 40
1000
2000
Layer 3
 2 = 12.2
 0.4 0.0 0.40
2000
4000
Va
ni
lla
Layer 1
 2 = 1.1
 0.4 0.0 0.40
700
1400
Layer 2
 2 = 0.16
 0.4 0.0 0.40
100
200
Layer 3
 2 =  0.87
 15 0 150
8000
16000
S
at
ur
at
ed
Layer 1
 2 = 4.4
 15 0 150
2000
4000
Layer 2
 2 = 3.51
 15 0 150
150
300
Layer 3
 2 = 2.8
(A)
(B)
Figure 1. Comparing the vanilla and saturating network’s weights
for the Sigmoid MLP (A) and ReLU MLP (B) in each layer. The
excess kurtosis (γ2) of each weight distribution is given as well.
In Figure 1, we compare the weight distributions of the
vanilla MLP to the saturating MLP. The saturating MLP
weights take on values in a larger range, with a tail that
tends to extreme values in the saturating regime of the non-
linearity. For the sigmoid, this leads to extreme weight val-
ues on both ends, while for the saturating ReLU MLP, this
leads to extreme negative values. A particularly dramatic
change in the weight distribution is a much larger positive
excess kurtosis for saturating versus vanilla networks. In-
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Figure 2. Comparing the vanilla (first row) and saturating net-
work’s activities, hl, for the Sigmoid (second row) and ReLU
MLP (third row) in each layer l.
deed, high kurtosis is a property shared by weight distribu-
tions in biological networks (Buzsa´ki & Mizuseki, 2014),
raising the question of whether or not it plays a functional
role in protection against adversarial examples. In §8, we
will demonstrate that highly kurtotic weight distributions
can act as a linear mechanism to protect against adversarial
examples, in addition to the nonlinear mechanism of satu-
ration.
Moreover, in Figure 2, we see that the pre-nonlinearity ac-
tivations at each layer across all 10,000 test examples also
tend to extreme values, as expected, validating that these
models are indeed operating in the saturating regime of
their respective nonlinearities.
Beyond examining the weights and the activations, we
also examine the global structure of internal representa-
tions by constructing, for each network and layer, the rep-
resentational dissimilarity matrix (RDM) of its activities
(Kriegeskorte et al., 2008). For each of the 10 classes, we
chose 100 test set examples at random, and computed the
pairwise squared distance matrix,
d(φ
(
hl,a
)
, φ
(
hl,b
)
) =
1
Nl
Nl∑
i=1
(
φ
(
hl,ai
)
− φ
(
hl,bi
))2
,
(9)
between all pairs a and b of the 1000 test examples. Here
hl,a and hl,b are the hidden unit activations at layer l on
inputs x0,a and x0,b, respectively.
As shown in Figure 3, a distinguishing feature emerges be-
tween the RDMs of the vanilla network and the saturated
network. At every layer, while within class dissimilarity,
in the diagonal blocks, is close to zero for both networks,
between class dissimilarities in the off-diagonal blocks are
much larger in the saturated network than in the vanilla
network. Moreover, this dissimilarity is progressively en-
hanced in saturating networks as one traverses deeper into
the network towards the final output. Thus while both net-
0 200 400 600 800
0
200
400
600
800Va
ni
lla
x0
0 200 400 600 800
0
200
400
600
800
x1
0 200 400 600 800
0
200
400
600
800
x2
0 200 400 600 800
0
200
400
600
800
S
at
ur
at
ed
0 200 400 600 800
0
200
400
600
800
0 200 400 600 800
0
200
400
600
800
0.00
0.32
0.64
Figure 3. Relational dissimilarity matrix for the Sigmoid MLP.
For the corresponding figure for the ReLU MLP, refer to Figure 7
in the Supplementary Material (SM).
works form internal representations in which images from
each class are mapped to tight clusters in internal represen-
tation space, these internal clusters are much further apart
from each other for saturating networks. This increased
cluster separation likely contributes to adversarial robust-
ness because it necessitates larger norm input perturbations
to move representations in deeper layers across decision
boundaries, not only in the output layer, but also in inter-
mediate layers.
6. The geometry of saturating networks
While the RDM analysis above showed increased cluster
separation in internal representations, we would like to un-
derstand better the geometry of the network input-output
map and how it contributes to adversarial robustness. To
this end, we seek to understand how motions in input space
are transformed to motions in the output space of probabil-
ity distributions over class labels.
To do so, we rely on the framework of information geom-
etry and Fisher information (Amari & Nagaoka, 1993). In
particular, the network output, as a probability distribution
over class labels, is endowed with a natural Riemannian
metric, given by the Fisher information. We can think of
the 10 dimensional vector of inputs hD in the final layer, as
coordinates on this space of distributions (modulo the irrel-
evant global scaling hD → λhD). In terms of these coor-
dinates, the actual probabilities are determined through the
softmax function: pi(hD) = 1Z e
hDi where Z =
∑
i e
hDi .
The Fisher information metric on the space hDi is then
given by
GFij =
∑
k
pk (∂zi log pk)
(
∂zj log pk
)
= piδij − pipj .
(10)
In turn, this metric on hD induces a metric on input space
x0 via the pullback operation on metrics. The resultant
metric Gin on input space is given by
Gin = JTGFJ, (11)
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where J = ∂h
D
∂x0 is the Jacobian from input space to layer
D. Geometrically, if one moves a small amount from x0
to x0 + dx, the resultant distance dl one moves in output
probability space, as measured by the Fisher information
metric, is given by
dl =
√∑
ij
Ginij dxidxj . (12)
Thus the metric assigns lengths to curves in input space
according to how far they induce motions in output space.
Also, the Jacobian J is of independent geometric interest.
As a local linearization of the input-output map, the number
of non-trivially large singular values of J determine how
many directions in input space the network’s input-output
map is locally sensitive to.
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Figure 4. Comparison between the vanilla (top 3 rows) and sat-
urating Sigmoid MLP’s (bottom 3 rows) length element, soft-
max output probabilities, and Jacobian singular values as a func-
tion of the interpolation parameter between source and target.
The columns denote a particular source and target class pair:
(S : 1, T : 7), (S : 3, T : 7), (S : 6, T : 9), (S : 0, T : 6).
A similar trend occurs for the ReLU MLP (data not shown).
To explore the geometric structure of both vanilla and satu-
rating deep network maps, we move continuously in input
space between the most confident images in a given source
class, x0S , and a target class, x
0
T along a simple linear inter-
polation path in pixel space:
x0(λ) = (1− λ)x0S + λx0T , λ ∈ [0, 1]. (13)
As we move along this path, in Figure 4, we plot the length
element in (12), the induced trajectory in output probabil-
ity space, and the spectrum of singular values of the Jaco-
bian J. As expected, the length element increases precisely
when the output trajectory in probability space makes large
transitions. At these points, one or more singular values of
J also inflate.
Several distinguishing features arise in the geometry of
vanilla versus saturated networks in Figure 4. The first
is that the length element is more smooth and continuous
for the vanilla network, but locally flat with sharp peaks
when class probabilities transition for the saturating net-
work. Thus for saturating networks, one can move long dis-
tances in input space without moving much at all in output
space. This property likely confers robustness to gradient-
based adversaries, which would have difficulty traversing
input space under such constant, or flat input-output maps.
A second distinguishing feature is that, in vanilla networks,
at probabilistic transition points, multiple singular values
inflate, while in saturating networks, only one singular
value does so. This implies that vanilla networks are sensi-
tive to multiple dimensions, while saturating networks per-
form extremely robust and rapid transitions between dis-
tinct probabilistic outputs in a way that sensitivity to input
perturbations in all directions orthogonal to the transition
are strongly suppressed. This property again likely confers
robustness to adversaries, as it strongly constrains the num-
ber of directions of expansion that an adversary can exploit
in order to alter output probabilities.
Finally, it is interesting to compare the geometry of these
trained networks to the Riemannian geometry of random
neural networks which often arise in initial conditions be-
fore training. An extensive analysis of this geometry, per-
formed by Poole et al. (2016), revealed the existence of
two phases in deep networks: a chaotic (ordered) phase
when the random weights have high (low) variance. In the
chaotic (ordered) phase the network locally expands (con-
tracts) input space everywhere. In contrast, trained net-
works flexibly deploy both ordered and chaotic phases dif-
ferentially across input space; they contract space at the
center of decision volumes and expand space in the vicin-
ity of decision boundaries. Saturating networks, however,
do this in a much more extreme manner than vanilla net-
works.
7. More powerful iterative adversaries
One can construct more powerful adversaries than the fast
sign gradient method by iteratively finding sensitive di-
rections in the input-output map and moving along them.
How robust are saturating networks to these types of ad-
versaries? From the information-geometric standpoint de-
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scribed above, given the local flatness of the input-output
map, as quantified by our Riemannian geometric analysis,
an iterative gradient-based adversary may still encounter
difficulty with the saturated network, especially since the
number of directions of expansion are additionally con-
strained by the compressive nature of the map.
We first created adversaries via iterative first order meth-
ods. For each chosen source image xS and its associated
correct source class yS , we chose a target class, yT 6= yS .
We then attempted to find adversarial perturbations that
cause the network to misclassify xs as belonging to class
yT . To do so, starting from x
(0)
adv = xS , we iteratively
minimized the cross entropy loss ` via gradient descent:
x
(t+1)
adv = x
(t)
adv − αt∇x(t)adv`(x
(t)
adv,yT ).
This procedure adjusts the adversarial example x(t)adv so as
to make the incorrect label yT more likely. We used Adam
(Kingma & Ba, 2015) so that the learning rate αt would be
adaptive at each iteration t. For a given source class, we
started with the source image the network was either least
or most confident on.
Although we were able to get the vanilla network to mis-
classify in either case (usually within less than 10 itera-
tions), there were several cases (such as when the source
class was a 3 and the target class was a 7) where we were
unable to get the saturated network to misclassify, even in
the most extreme case where we ran Adam for 30 million
iterations. Although the image was changing at each iter-
ation and the mean pixel distance from the starting image
was steadily increasing and converged, the resultant image
did not cause the saturated network to misclassify.
Figure 5. Comparison between the vanilla (A) and saturating Sig-
moid MLP’s (B) adversarial images after 1000 iterations of L-
BFGS. The red ‘X’ denotes that an adversarial image that causes
misclassification was not found within 1000 iterations of L-
BFGS. The source image was for the least confident image for
that source class. A similar trend occurs for the ReLU MLP (data
not shown).
Figure 6. The ratio ‖w1‖22/‖w2 −w1‖1, scaled by the mean per
component average value of |w1|, as a function of excess kurtosis
(γ2) of a Pearson Type VII distribution, which the weights were
sampled from. The red point indicates the case of standard Gaus-
sian weights with excess kurtosis 0. Because we are scaling by
the intensity, or per-component average of w1, a value of 1.4 on
the y-axis here indicates that the typical per-component value of
the perturbation is 1.4 times larger than the typical per-component
strength of the test example. Thus these perturbations are unlikely
to be imperceptible.
As a result, we moved onto second order adversaries, as
Szegedy et al. (2014) had similarly considered. Thus, we
considered quasi-Newton methods such as L-BFGS where
we would minimize the cross entropy loss ` as follows:
x
(t+1)
adv = x
(t)
adv − αtB−1t ∇x(t)adv`(x
(t)
adv,yT ),
where Bt is the approximate Hessian at iteration t and the
learning rate αt is obtained by performing a line search in
the direction pt where Btpt = −∇x(t)adv`(yS ,yT ).
In Figure 5, we ran L-BFGS for 1000 iterations on both the
vanilla network and the saturated network, starting with a
source image that each network correctly classified but had
the lowest softmax probability in that class (lowest confi-
dence). In Figure 8 in the Supplementary Material (SM),
we also include the same analysis, but starting with the
most confident source image in each class.
Regardless of whether we start with a source image with
the least or highest confidence in that class, we can always
find an adversarial image to fool the vanilla network to mis-
classify as the intended target class (and usually within 1-2
iterations). However, for the saturated network, even start-
ing with the least confident source image, we were, in the
majority of cases, unable to fool the network. Moreover, as
depicted in Figure 8 in the Supplementary Material (SM),
it was even more difficult to fool the saturated network with
the most confident source image, resulting in only 5 such
cases, even after 1000 iterations.
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8. Role of weight kurtosis: a linear
mechanism for robustness to adversaries
As we observed in §5, saturating networks had high kur-
tosis weight distributions in every layer when compared
to their vanilla counterparts. Indeed, such kurtotic weight
distributions are prevalent in biological neural networks
(Buzsa´ki & Mizuseki, 2014). Here we demonstrate that
high kurtosis weight distributions can act as a linear mech-
anism to guard against adversarial examples.
Indeed, sensitivity to adversarial examples is not unique
to neural networks, but arises in many machine learning
methods, including linear classification. Consider for ex-
ample a classification problem with two cluster prototypes
with weight vectors w1 ∈ Rn and w2 ∈ Rn. For sim-
plicity, we assume w1 and w2 lie in orthogonal directions,
so w1 · w2 = 0. An input x is classified as class 1 if
w1 · x > 0, otherwise x is classified as class 2. Now con-
sider a test example that is the cluster prototype for class 1,
i.e. x = w1. Let us further consider an adversarial pertur-
bationw1 +∆x. This perturbed input will be misclassified
if and only if (w2 − w1) · (w1 + ∆x) > 0. Following
the fast sign gradient method, we can choose ∆x to be the
maximum perturbation under the constraint ‖∆x‖∞ <  in
(3). This optimal perturbation is ∆x =  sgn(w2 − w1).
In order to have this bounded l∞ norm perturbation cause
a misclassification, we must then have the condition
 > min ≡ ‖w1‖
2
2
‖w2 −w1‖1 . (14)
Here, recall we are assuming w1 · w2 = 0 for simplicity.
Thus if the l1 norm in the denominator is small, then the
network is adversarially robust in the sense that a large per-
turbation is required to cause a misclassification, whereas
if the l1 norm is large, then it is not.
Now in high dimensional spaces, l1 norms can be quite
large relative to l2 norms. In particular for any unit l2 norm
vector v, we have 1 ≤ ‖v‖1 ≤
√
n, where the upper bound
is realized by a dense uniform vector with each entry 1√
n
and the lower bound is realized by a coordinate vector with
one nonzero entry equal to 1. Both these vectors are on
the l2 ball of radius 1, but this l2 ball intersects the circum-
scribing l1 ball of radius
√
n at the former vector, and the
inscribing l1 ball of radius 1 at the latter vector. This in-
tersection of l1 and l2 balls of very different radii in a high
dimensional space likely contributes to the prevalence of
adversarial examples in high dimensional linear classifica-
tion problems by allowing the denominator in (14) to be
large and the numerator to be small.
However, we can avoid the bad regime of dense uniform
vectors with large l1 norm if the weights are sampled from
a kurtotic distribution. In this case, we may then expect
that the numerator ‖w1‖22 in (14) would be large as we are
likely to sample from extreme values, but that the denom-
inator ‖w2 − w1‖1 would be small due to the peak of the
distribution near 0. To test this idea, we sampled unit norm
random vectors of dimension 20000, so that w1 ·w2 ≈ 0.
We sampled their values iid from a Pearson Type VII dis-
tribution, with density function given by
f(x; γ2) = c(γ2)
1 +( x√
2 + 6/γ2
)2−5/2−3/γ2 ,
where c(γ2) = 1(√
2+6/γ2
)
B(2+3/γ2, 12 )
, B is the Euler
Beta function, and γ2 denotes the excess kurtosis of the
distribution. In Figure 8, we computed the ratio in (14) and
scaled it by the input intensity, which is given by the av-
erage absolute value of a nonzero component of w1. The
resultant scaled ratio was then computed for each value of
γ2. Note that a standard Gaussian has an excess kurtosis
of 0, which serves as a baseline. Hence, increasing the ex-
cess kurtosis via, for example, a Pearson Type VII density,
increases the scaled ratio by almost 40% from the Gaus-
sian baseline. In fact, if we sample, via inverse transform
sampling, from the weight distribution of the saturated net-
work at a given layer, then the scaled ratio can increase
by as much as 300% from when we sample from the dis-
tribution of the weights in that same layer for the vanilla
network. Thus even in the case of linear classification,
kurtotic weight distributions, including the weight distri-
butions learned by our saturating networks, can improve
robustness to adversarial examples.
9. Discussion
In summary, we have shown that a simple, biologically in-
spired strategy for finding highly nonlinear networks op-
erating in a saturated regime provides interesting mech-
anisms for guarding DNNs against adversarial examples
without ever computing them. Not only do we gain im-
proved performance over adversarially trained networks on
adversarial examples generated by the fast gradient sign
method, but our saturating networks are also relatively ro-
bust against iterative, targeted methods including second-
order adversaries. We additionally move beyond empirical
results to analyze the sources of intrinsic robustness to ad-
versarial perturbations. Our information geometric analy-
ses reveal several important features, including highly flat
and low dimensional internal representations that neverthe-
less widely separate images from different classes. More-
over, we have demonstrated that the highly kurtotic weight
distributions found both in our networks and in our brains,
can act as a linear mechanism against adversarial examples.
Overall, we hope our results can aid in combining theory
and experiment to form the basis of a general theory of bio-
logically plausible mechanisms for adversarial robustness.
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Figure 7. Relational dissimilarity matrix for the ReLU MLP.
Figure 8. Comparison between the vanilla (A) and saturating Sigmoid MLP’s (B) adversarial images after 1000 iterations of L-BFGS.
The red ‘X’ denotes that an adversarial image was not found in order to cause the network to misclassify for that target class. The source
image was for the most confident image for that source class.
